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A physician from a Midwest state suffers a depressive illness which
causes him distress but in no way impairs his ability to practice
medicine. He seeks psychiatric care and is successfully treated with a
combination of psychotherapy and antidepressant medication.
He moves to a Southern state, applies for a license, and passes the
examination. In response to a question on the Southern state's
application, he discloses his treatment for depression. The board of the
Southern state requires he join the impaired physician program. The
board concedes his illness does not now, nor did it ever, adversely
affect his ability to practice medicine with skill and safety, but imposes
periodic "monitoring" as a condition to practice. He accepts the
restricted license in the Southern state because, while it is a nuisance,
his ability to practice with skill and safety is not compromised.

IProfessor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University.
2

Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, University of Miami School of Medicine.
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This license restriction is reported to data banks or revealed during
the Midwest state's renewal process. Based on the Southern state's
restriction, his renewal application is denied, and his license to practice
medicine in the Midwest state is suspended.
Something is wrong with the system.
What is wrong is boards consider illness, rather than functional impairment,
as a factor in determining both competence to practice and license restrictions.
Boards are charged with the duty to protect patients from incompetent
physicians. To meet that duty,boards claim they need to know about a doctor's
mental illness or substance abuse. Although medical data does not support this
claim, previous challenges failed because of an inability to overcome the
presumption that presence of mental illness or substance abuse is rationally
related to competence to practice. Some courts have recognized doctors possess
limited property and liberty interests in their profession,,3 however, additional
inquiries 4 and license restrictions based on illness have survived if boards
provided procedural due process. 5 Courts have also used a balancing test to
6
reject arguments based on the physician's privacy rights.
Results should be different under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 7 passed to prevent discrimination against sick people. Because
Congress elevated people with disabilities to suspect class status, board

3
See, e.g., Hirsch v. NJ. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 600 A.2d 493 (NJ. Super.
1991) affd 607 A.2d 986 (1992). A licensed physician and two state medical societies
challenged questions-including inquiries about mental illness and substance
abuse-on the New Jersey biennial license renewal application. The court reviewed
recent state legislation enacted to encourage physicians to obtain treatment and to
permit boards to deal with impaired physicians. Interpreting the questions as attempts
to determine whether the physician is impaired, the court said a medical license "'is not
a basic individual right. While it embraces a substantial individual interest which
deserves abundant protection, it cannot be equated with a fundamental right, the
reasonable regulation of which can be measured and justified only by a compelling state
interest."' Id. at 497, quoting In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7 (N.J. 1982). Nevertheless, the court
recognized that the board could not achieve its legitimate purpose of identifying
impaired physicians by violating a licensee's constitutional rights. Id. at 497-99.
4

Similar questions arise about inquiries concerning history of mental illness or
substance abuse on professional license applications. See generallyPhyllis Coleman and
Ronald A. Shellow, Ask About Conduct,Not Mental Illness: A Proposalfor Bar Examiners
and Medical Boards to Comply with the ADA and Constitution, 20 J. OF LEGIS. 147 (1994).
That issue is beyond the scope of this article.
5
But see Timothy Stolzfus Jost, The Necessary and ProperRole of Regulation to Assure
the Quality of Health Care,25 HousToN L. REv. 525, 587 (1988) suggesting boards might
provide doctors too much protection causing increased risks to their patients. 'Layer on
layer of due process has been provided professionals, reflecting the high regard
accorded the precious professional license, yet largely disregarding the threat
incompetents pose to the lives and health of their patients."
6
See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.

742 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Supp. 1994).
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procedures for imposing restrictions based on illness must now survive strict
scrutiny. Boards can easily satisfy the first part of this test by demonstrating a
compelling state interest in protecting the public from incompetent physicians.
However, license restrictions based on illness fail the second part of the test:
absent proof of a sufficient link between history of illness or addiction and
competence to practice, license restrictions based solely on sickness are simply
not narrowly tailored to effectuate the concededly compelling state interest in
protecting the public from bad doctors.
In fact, when boards treat restrictions based on illness the same as those
resulting from conduct demonstrating or foreshadowing substandard practice,
they not only violate the ADA, they lose sight of their objective. Boards
sincerely interested in identifying bad doctors should shift their focus from
illness to behavior.8
Flawed board practices are further complicated by comprehensive reporting
requirements. All restrictions, whether based on competence or illness, are
reported or available to centralized data banks and other state boards. This
means, even if a physician's ability to practice is never impaired, a state might
improperly deny his application or suspend his license because of another
state's illness-based restriction. Ironically, by mandating all restrictions be
reported, the system actually encourages decisions based on irrelevant license
limitations, and permits boards to sidestep the difficult task of identifying
incompetent physicians.
Part I of this article briefly explores the licensing and disciplinary processes.
Because each state board has broad discretion in reaching its decisions, 9 an
illness might be ignored in one state, trigger only periodic monitoring in
another, and be grounds for sanction in a third. As the duty of every state board
is the same-to protect patients from incompetent doctors-this disparate
treatment is absurd. The implicit notion that the impact of a physician's illness
on his ability to practice changes depending on a state line is not credible.
Although statutes and cases10 may use different language to define
8

See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.

9

Kathleen L. Blaner, Comment, Physician, Heal Thyself. Because the Cure, the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act, May Be Worse than the Disease, 37 CATH.U.L. REV. 1073,
1079-80 (1988) [hereinafter Physician,Heal Thysel]].
Physicians are licensed through state boards composed primarily of other doctors.
See, e.g., Coe v. United States Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Colo., 676 F.2d 411,414 (10th Cir. 1982)
explaining the Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners has ninephysician members
and two from the public at large. The general presumption has been that physicians are

the best judges of their peers. Harold L. Hirsh, The Medical-Legal Implicationsof the Errant
or "Sick" Physician,1976 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 377.

In fact, as far back as 1760, the colonies established boards to license qualified
physicians. Their primary responsibilities were licensing and disciplining doctors. Each
state retains discretion to decide standards for licensure. Generally, boards sanction
physicians for conduct which is harmful or involves moral turpitude. Physician, Heal

Thyself, supranote 9, at 1078-80.
10
The traditional malpractice standard depended on the reasonable physician in his
geographic area. Thomas E.Dvorak, BoardCertificationand Summary Judgment Under the

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 43:273

incompetence, there is fundamental agreement that doctors in every state
should practice with skill and safety.
Part II exposes fundamental defects in the current reporting to national data
banks. The goal of preventing incompetent physicians from injuring a series of
uninformed patients in several states is commendable. Implementation is not.
For example, to comply with the Health Care Quality Improvement Act's
(HCQIA) requirement to report any action which "revokes or suspends (or
otherwise restricts) a physician's license... "11 boards might inappropriately
report restrictions such as monitoring medication or participating in a
substance abuse program. But, simply not reporting doctors12 who participate
in an impaired physician's program is insufficient. Because involvement in a
program might be unrelated to impairment, monitoring and absence of
confidentiality mean this option may unnecessarily infringe upon a doctor's
right to privacy and violate the ADA without helping protect the public from
incompetent physicians.
In fact, because the HCQIA requires entities report only actions related to
"professional competence or professional conduct," 13 illness-based restrictions
need not be disclosed. No evidence exists to support the inference that a
doctor's "professional competence or professional conduct" is compromised
merely because he either suffers from a disorder which requires medication or
battles an addiction.

Idaho MedicalMalpracticeAct:Trapsfor the Unwary, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 421,423-24 (1992-93).
However, this does not support similar distinctions in license restriction decisions.
Further, the malpractice rule is changing. Some jurisdictions currently apply a
national standard in recognition of "the uniformity of medical training and the almost
instantaneous availability of medical information throughout the country." Id. at 425.
Moreover, although it may still be possible to argue the availability of different
technological and human resources could make a national malpractice standard unfair
or unworkable, the same is not true for impact of illness on ability to practice.
1142 U.S.C. § 11132(a)(1)(A) (1995).
12 Before the National Practitioner Data Bank, the "only national resources for
collecting data on individual physicians have been the Federation of State Licensing
Boards, which provides a clearinghouse for state disciplinary actions, and the AMA's
Masterfile, which records essential data on each physician, starting with his enrollment
in any U.S. program of medical training. The Masterfile also alerts state regulators to
disciplinary actions in other states and responds to inquiries by hospitals (250,000 in
1985)." CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 402 (1988). However,
neither maintains the wide range of material in the National Practitioner Data Bank.
In fact, commentators claim one explanation for "why incompetent physicians,
though arguably few in number, pose such a significant threat" to good health care is
their ability to simply move to another state and open a practice. Without a national
comprehensive reporting system, boards had "no thorough way of uncovering"
malpractice and disciplinary histories. Charity Scott, Medical PeerReview, Antitrust, and
the Effect of Statutory Reform, 50 MD. L. REV. 316, 325 (1991).
1342 U.S.C. § 11132(a)(1)(A) (1995).
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The Federation of State Medical Boards 14 also collects licensure data. But,
the Federation records and distributes all actions, not only those related to
professional competence. 15
Part III explains that the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits treating
persons with disabilities-or even those "regarded as" disabled-differently
solely because of their illness. In imposing and reporting illness-based
restrictions, without evidence of impairment, boards violate the ADA by
discriminating against people based on their sickness.
Part [V reviews a few particularly egregious board decisions. These cases
illustrate board prejudice against doctors suffering from mental illness or past
substance abuse. Because these boards fail to distinguish between sickness and
impairment, their conclusions are not only incorrect, they violate the ADA.
Part V explores an inherent flaw in the current system. Regardless of their
ability to practice with skill and safety, sick doctors may be referred to impaired
physician programs. Doctors, who should know better, confuse illness with
impairment.
Finally, this article proposes a simple solution to comply with the ADA while
achieving the boards' duty to protect the public and prevent incompetent
doctors from moving to another state and injuring unsuspecting patients.
Boards should only impose restrictions which involve the physician's
"professional competence or professional conduct." This would also mean that
the only restrictions reported would be those based on incompetence or
misconduct.
I. MEDICAL BOARDS
Medical boards face the difficult but essential task of protecting the public
from incompetent physicians. Indeed, licensing boards "are widely, if dimly,
perceived as the keepers of the gate of the medical profession." 16 Boards
discharge this responsibility at four critical stages of the process: 1) Initial
license, 2) license renewal, 3) disciplinary proceedings, and 4) license
application in one state by a physician previously licensed in a different state.
Unfortunately, many boards still use history of mental illness or substance
abuse to reach decisions at each point.
14

This national organization includes the licensing and disciplinary medical boards

from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
Medicare and Medicaid Patientand Program Protection Act of 1984: Hearingson H.R. 5989
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, and the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 54 (1984) (Statement of Bryant L. Galusha, Exec. Vice-President and Chief

Operating Officer, Federation of State Medical Bd.)
15Fitzhugh Mullan et al., The NationalPractitionerData Bank Report From the FirstYear,
268 JAMA 73, 76 (1992).
16 Timothy S. Jost et al.,
Consumers, Complaints, and ProfessionalDiscipline: A Look at
Medical Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 309, 338 (1993) [hereinafter Consumers,
Complaints,and ProfessionalDiscipline].
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A. Initial License
More than one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court approved state
authority to regulate who may practice medicine. 17 In exercising their power
"to provide for the general welfare," states may impose requirements
"appropriate to the calling or profession, and obtainable by reasonable
study
or application." 18 States delegate their regulatory duty to agencies or boards. 19
These boards are granted broad deference, but criteria 2 0 imposed must have at
21
least a rational relation to an applicant's fitness to practice.
While many diseases manifest in ways that could affect an applicant's
competence to practice, license restrictions imposed to monitor illnesses do not
necessarily involve competence. If boards want to protect the public from any
doctor who truly poses an increased risk to his patients, they should only
restrict the license of the physician whose behavior suggests monitoring is
needed. The simple fact that a physician is ill and takes medicine on a regular

17
18

Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1888).

1d. at 122.

9

1 Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the
Regulatory Implicationsof Taking ProfrssorKatz Seriously, 38 ST. Louis U.LJ. 63, 66 (1993).
Whether the system "works," by meeting "society's goals of improving the quality of
medical services, disciplining professionals, and preventing the non-licensed practice
of medicine" is an "open" question. Id.
Challenges to such delegation have been repeatedly rebuffed. See, e.g., Douglas v.
Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923).
20Citizenship and residency requirements have been successfully challenged and
eliminated, but character and fitness criteria are upheld. RANDOLPH P. REAVES, THE LAW
OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION30-39 (1sted. 1984). Unfortunately, some
state boards inappropriately treat sickness as a character and fitness issue. Instead,
although somewhat ambiguous, "'good moral character"' should be defined as
including "simple honesty, fairness, respect for the rights of others, and for the law."
Abrahamson v. Dept. of Professional Regulations, 568 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1991).
Consent to mental and physical examinations if the board questions a doctor's
ability to practice with skill and safety is a condition to licensure in a majority of states.
Humenansky v. Minnesota Bd. of Medical Examiners, 525 N.W.2d 559,563, n.1 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994). This means boards may order medical evaluations when they have
probable cause to believe the physician poses a risk to patient safety. Id. at 562. "When
a conflict arises between a physician's right to pursue a medical profession and the
state's right to protect its citizenry, the physician's right must yield to the state's power
to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations in order to protect the state's people from
incompetent and unfit practitioners." Id. at 567.
21
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). The applicant in Schware
was seeking a license to practice law rather than medicine. However, the principles are
the same in all cases involving "professions requiring skill and learning prior to
licensure." Reaves, supra note 20, at 2.
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basis should not be grounds for restriction. 22 Moreover, even if such a
restriction is imposed, it should not be reported. 23
B. License Renewal
24

In many states physicians must renew their licenses at prescribed intervals.
This requirement helps licensing boards determine each doctor's continuing
competence. 25 A problem may occur when, during the relicensing process, a
board discovers a physician's license has been restricted in another state.
Although restrictions relating to "professional competence or professional
conduct '2 6 are relevant, those based solely on illness are not. Use of an
illness-based restriction to reject a renewal application, revoke, or suspend a
license is not only inappropriate, it violates the ADA. 27 If a board discovers
22
Even HHS recognizes merely entering "a drug, alcohol, or psychiatric
rehabilitation program" should not by itself bea reportable event. U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK GUIDEBOOK 42 [hereinafter

GUIDEBOOK]. This lends support to the argument that history of abuse should not
constitute grounds for license restriction.
23
An ambiguity in the HCQIA casts doubt on whether such action was meant to be
a reportable event. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. The 1992 Supplement
to the Guidebook provides examples of adverse licensure actions which "should not be
reported." Unfortunately, one example actually increases the confusion:
* A settlement agreement which imposes monitoring of a practitioner
for a specific period of time, unless such monitoring constitutes a restriction of the practitioner's license or is considered to be a reprimand.
GUIDEBOOK 1992 Supplement 24. It is difficult to see how a board's monitoring would
not "otherwise restrict" a doctor's license.
24

The value of relicensing varies depending on the rigor of the board's process.

25

Licensing boards generally do not receive information concerning disciplinary
actions by hospitals and malpractice payments in other states. Queries to the Data Bank
as part of the license renewal process supply this potentially relevant information. U.S.
DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, USEFULNESS AND IMPACT OF REPORTS TO STATE LICENSING

BOARDS ii-iii (March 1993) [hereinafter USEFULNESS AND IMPACT]. Further, even without
querying the Data Bank, boards obtain a great deal of information as a result of the
system created by the HCQLA. For example, all reports of malpractice payments made
in a state are automatically sent to the board in that state. In addition, the Act makes
boards the conduit for receiving reports of adverse actions from health care entities in
their states and sending copies to the Data Bank.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that a 1993 study concluded that Data Bank
responses provided new information to state boards, but none of the decisions would
have been different without the reports. Id. However, conclusions based on this
information are of limited value because the sample was too small to be meaningful.
In many states, laws also require reporting malpractice payments and hospital
disciplinary actions. Adverse actions taken by other state boards against physicians are
also reported. Id. ati. In some states, restrictions and participation in impaired physician
programs are divulged in response to any inquiry.
2642 U.S.C. § 11132(a)(1)(A) (1995).
27

See infra notes 68-97 and accompanying text.
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during the relicensure process a physician suffers from some illness, it should
issue an unrestricted license unless, based on the doctor's behavior, some
limitation is necessary.28
C. DisciplinaryProceedings
29
As part of their duty to protect the public from incompetent physicians,
30
boards sanction doctors who fail to practice medicine with skill and safety.

28During the renewal process, imposing or reporting a restriction based only on
illness probably violates the ADA. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
29
1t is interesting to note that "[diespite a general belief that medical licensure boards
should play a major role in assuring the clinical competence of physicians, it is clear...
most disciplinary actions do not focus directly on issues of clinical competence."
Consumers, Complaints,and Professional Discipline, supra note 16, at 332. In fact, in one
study of 65 formal and informal board interventions, only six were directly based on
improper clinical practices not involving prescribing controlled substances. Contrast
this with the 11 interventions based, at least in part, on "physical or mental impairment
of the practitioner (usually substance abuse)." Id.
3
OSanctions may be imposed for some conduct unrelated to the practice of medicine.
Raymond v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 443 N.E.2d 391, 394-95 (Mass. 1982).
However, that does not mean a doctor's license may be restricted for medical conditions
unrelated to practice. The difference is clear: boards may discipline doctors for conduct,
not status. For example, the behavior of a physician convicted of a crime-even if not
associated with his practice--calls his moral character into question. "Disciplining
physicians for lack of good moral character, and for conduct that undermines public
confidence in the integrity of the profession is reasonably related to promotion of the
public health, welfare, and safety." Id. at 395.
Illness is different. No one would suggest a physician lacks good moral character
simply because he suffers from cancer or heart disease. The same is true for mental
illness and substance abuse. For example, in a lawyer licensing case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court noted the cases "make clear that alcoholism is not a defect in character
or personality." In re Strait, 577 A.2d 149,157 (N.J. 1990). After conceding "alcoholism is
a disease that adversely affects the exercise of good judgment and clear thinking, and
is frequently characterized by denial of its existence," the court said it is important to
distinguish conduct-which is a critical factor in a doctor's ability to practice-from
illness. Id.
An argument could be made that permitting doctors suffering from mental illness
to practice "undermines public confidence in the integrity of the profession." However,
this speculation is insufficient to preserve illness-based restrictions for two reasons.
First, the theory is based on myths and prejudices against the mentally ill. Second,
although a greater number of the mentally ill may be impaired, so that restrictions based
on sickness might be rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting the
public, that is no longer enough. Because restrictions are based on disability, the ADA
requires they survive strict scrutiny. They cannot. See infra text accompanying notes
75-76.
On the other hand, in some jurisdictions, drug use may constitute grounds for
discipline even absent impairment. This argument rests on the notion that the doctor
"occupies a unique and centralized position in the overall elaborate regulatory scheme
established by the Legislature to control dangerous drugs and narcotics." B.W. v. Board
of Medical Quality Assurance, 215 Cal. Rptr. 130, 135 (Cal. App. 1985). See also Furer v.
Sobol, 576 N.Y.S.2d 632,633 (1991) holding there is "no necessity" of impairment due to
drugs for boards to impose probation. Board sanctions would survive if applied only
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However, because the physician's license represents a constitutionally
protected interest,31 it cannot be revoked, suspended or restricted without due
process. 32
A recent increase in physician disciplinary actions33 follows years of
criticism that boards too often protect incompetent doctors. 34 Boards are

to current drug users-a group explicitly excluded from ADA protection-because they
meet the weak level rational basis test. However, attempts to sanction former, or those
merely regarded as, substance abusers would probably fail because they cannot satisfy
strict scrutiny. See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
31
Although the right to practice medicine is a property right, it is "conditional and
subject to the police power of the state." Garrison v. Board of Trustees of Memorial
Hospital of Laramie County, Wyoming, 795 P.2d 190,193 (Wyo. 1990). By establishing
criteria for discipline, states create "a 'property' interest in a blemish-free license to
practice medicine." Fleury v. Clayton, 847 F.2d 1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1988). While the
Supreme Court has consistently held that injury to reputation is not by itself a protected
liberty interest (e.g., Siegertv. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,233 (1991)), by imposing and reporting
license restrictions, boards do more than affect a doctor's reputation. They also influence
his ability to work.
32

Procedural due process is generally satisfied by timely and complete explanation
of the charges and a hearing, the parameters of which vary from state to state. Reaves,
supra note 20, at 123-28.
Determination of constitutionally required due process for a particular
situation is essentially a balancing test involving consideration of governmental interests in efficiency and accurate determinations, private
concerns at stake in the case, the complexity of the issues, the nature
of the proceedings and its other safeguards, and an assessment of
the danger to society from inaccurate determinations in each direction.
Sherman v. Comm'n on Licensure to Practice, 407 A.2d 595, 600-01 (D.C. App. 1979).
See also Devous v. Wyoming State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 415
(Wyo. 1993) (citing Gilchrist v. Bierring, 14 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Iowa 1944)).
The right to earn a living is among the greatest of human rights and,
when lawfully pursued, cannot be denied. It is the common right of
every citizen to engage in any honest employment he may choose,
subject only to such reasonable regulations as are necessary for the
public good. Due process of law is satisfied only by such safeguards
as will adequately protect these fundamental, constitutional rights
of the citizen. Where the state confers a license to engage in a profession, trade, or occupation, not inherently inimical to the public
welfare, such license becomes a valuable personal right which cannot be denied or abridged in any manner except after due notice
and a fair and impartial hearing before an unbiased tribunal. Were
this not so, no one would be safe from oppression wherever power
may be lodged, one might be easily deprived of important rights
with no opportunity to defend against wrongful accusations. This
would subvert the most precious rights of the citizen.
33
The number of physicians disciplined in 1994 increased by 11.8 percent over 1993.
The 3685 doctors sanctioned in 1994 is 40 percent greater than three years ago. This
number represents 0.6 percent of the 615,854 licensed physicians in the United States.
Punishingof DoctorsIncreased in 1994, THE NEw YoRK TIMEs, April 6, 1995, at A20 col. 4.
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supposed to punish 35 and deter bad doctors. Doctors should be disciplined for
improper behavior, not because they are sick. 3 6 Because past professional
The rates of disciplinary actions vary. An interesting, but unexplained, problem is
"an inverse relationship ... between rates of licensure actions and the size of the state's
physician population, i.e., the greater the number of physicians in a state, the lower the
state's licensure action rate and vice versa." Mullan, supra note 15, at 75.
34

The authors of one interesting empirical study conclude the recent increase in use
and severity of physician discipline has had little impact on incidents of malpractice.
See generallyLawrence Southwick, Jr. & GaryJ. Young, Doctors, Lawyers, and Malpractice
Insurance:Is PhysicianDisciplineorLegal RestrictiontheAnswer?, 12 LAw & POLY 155 (Apr.
1990). "[S]erious disciplinary actions" against doctors rose from 1437 in 1990 to 2013 in
1991. Too Few Actions Reach Incompetence, Negligence, Public Citizen Study Claims, 2 HLR
3 d23 (Jan. 21, 1993). However, the increase might be attributable to a new Federation
classification system rather than a change in policy, according to a non-profit consumer
advocacy group study. The Public Citizen Report explained that "license restrictions
distinct from probation" are now included. Id.
35
Sanctions range from an informal confrontation resulting in an agreement to
participate in a rehabilitation program without license restriction to suspension or
revocationfollowing a formal hearing. RobertS. Walzer, ImpairedPhysiciansAn Overview
and Update of the Legal Issues, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 131, 134 (1990). Dr. Walzer provides a
review of a representative sample of medical board procedures.
Revocation is a particularly harsh remedy. Not only does the physician lose his
license to practice, but "any property rights or interest stemming from that license are
likewise voided or annulled." Pittenger v. Department of State, Bureau of Professional
and Occupational Affairs, 596 A.2d 1227,1230 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (quoting Keeley v.
State Real Estate Comm'n, 501 A.2d 1155,1158 (Pa. 1985)). Courts recognize the "gravity
of the situation ....

[w]ithout his license he will lose his practice, and without his

practice, he will lose his livelihood." Wills v. Board of Medical Examiners, 384 S.E.2d
636, 638 (Ga. 1989).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, under certain circumstances, boards consider
dispositions which are not disciplinary action and thus need not be reported. These
letters of agreement may be appropriate if the physician is recovering from substance
abuse, patient health has not been threatened, and the doctor identified himself to the
board prior to any outside reports. These agreements require the doctor waive
confidentiality for current and future employers and other state boards where he either
disputes the misconduct allegation or is licensed. James S. Bolan, Practicebefore the Board
of Registration in Medicine, 38 BOSTON BJ. 5 (May/June 1994). Boards also possess
authority, "byadjudication and order to limit or otherwise restrict a license or to require
the physician to submit to care, counseling, or treatment" by a board doctor. Robert L.
Sadoff and Julie B. Sadoff, The Impaired Health Professional Legal and Ethical Issues, in
PSYCHIATRIC-LEGAL DECISION MAKING BY THE MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONER THE

CLINICIAN DE FACTO MAGISTRATE 259 (Harvey Bluestone et al., eds. 1994) [hereinafter The
ImpairedHealthProfessional].
A board imposed penalty will only be modified if it was not supported by the
findings. "'The propriety of a penalty imposed by an administrative agency is a matter
vested in the discretion of the agency, and its decision may not be disturbed unless there
has been a manifest abuse of discretion."' Williamson v. Board of Medical Quality
Assurance, 266 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Cal. App. 1990) (quoting Lake v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 47 Cal. App. 3d 224, 228 (1975)).
Commentators suggest licensing boards have historically failed as a deterrent to
"deficient but not completely incompetent" physicians. Jost, supra note 5, at 586.
Professor Jost argues traditional revocation and suspension remedies are so harsh they
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incompetence or misconduct is a proper factor in a board's decision on
appropriate sanction, 37 information about these restrictions is relevant.
38
Disclosure of restrictions based on sickness is not.
D. Previously Licensed Physicians
When a physician applies for a license in a different state, queries to data
banks or to otherboards may reveal restrictions or adverse actions. Professional
regulation is a state function; therefore, if boards discover a physician's license
is restricted in another jurisdiction, 39 they have options-some appropriate,
are "seldom used." Other sanctions, including "continuing supervision, forced continuing education, or re-examination, are more responsive" to most problems boards face.
Professor Jost also proposes restitution for victims. Id.
36
Attempts to raise illness as an issue to mitigate sanctions achieve varying degrees
of success.
37

Boards enjoy "considerable discretion... 'to effectively address the varied degrees
of culpability that are often associated with acts of professional misconduct and to tailor
an appropriate sanction to theparticular facts and circumstances of the case."' Colorado
State Bd. of Medicine v. Hoffner, 832 P.2d 1062,1068 (Colo. App. 1992) (quoting Kibler
v. State, 718 P.2d 531, 535 (Colo. 1986)).
38In some jurisdictions, impaired physicians can avoid investigation or discipline by
entering an approved diversion program. See, e.g., CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 2340
(Deering 1995). However, to be eligible for this protection, the physician may need to
be a formal participant in the program. Kees v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d 112, 117-18 (Cal. App. 1992).
In Florida, a consultant determines when in his "professional judgment
intervention is necessary" based on evidence of impairment. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §
61-10.007(5) (1995). The impaired physician participates voluntarily, but if he leaves
prior to successful completion of the program, "all information concerning the
practitioner's case will be forwarded to the Department." Id. at § 61-10.007(6)(c).
Unfortunately, this is not the only way the information may become public. H.J.M. v.
B.R.C. & R.H.C., 603 So.2d 1331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
In H.I.M., the court permitted medical malpractice plaintiffs to discover
information about defendantphysician's treatment received ata substanceabuse facility
while he was in the impaired practitioner's program. The doctor had mentioned his
treatment during a deposition, but refused to comply with a request for all his records.
Nevertheless, after an in camera review, the trial court required disclosure. The order
concluded "theneed forand probative value of the information outweighed the possible
harm of disclosure to Dr. M., and that the subject material would be disclosed only to
the parties, counsel of record, and persons employed by them in preparing for trial. The
court expressly recited that it had not determined whether the material would
ultimately be admissible at trial." Id. at 1332.
Dr. M. also refused to comply with subsequent attempts to depose him concerning
his past substance abuse and information relating to treatment at two rehabilitation
facilities. The appellate court also affirmed the trial court in requiring this testimony.
Further, the doctor waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege by providing part of
the information prior to raising this argument. Id. at 1334.
39
As early as 1938, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded granting or denying a
license to a physician from another state is within the board's discretion. "In exercising
supervision over the health of several millions broad discretionary powers must be
necessarily granted, and it is only when that discretion is abused that the courts will
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some not.40 Boards can simply ignore the information and conduct their own
investigation. They can also treat the report as one factor in their
decision-making process. A problem occurs, however, when boards treat an
illness-based restriction as grounds for denying a license. Boards do have the
right-indeed the obligation-to make licensing decisions based on the
competence of the applicant. 41 Information about the physician's level of care
in another state is certainly relevant to whether he is likely to practice with skill
and safety if granted a license in this state.42 On the other hand, using an

interfere." Salowitz v. Michigan State Bd. of Registration in Medicine, 280 N.W. 737,740
(Mich. 1938).
40Boards

do misuse information obtained from other states. One example, although

not based on illness, is Mannan v. District of Columbia Bd. of Medicine, 558 A.2d 329
(D.C. Cir. 1989). Doctor Mannan, who was licensed in the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Michigan, was charged with Medicaid fraud in Maryland. On advice of
counsel, he agreed to a plea "prior to judgment" and probation. Id. at 330-31. His
Maryland license was not restricted, and he was allowed to continue practicing. Id. at
331.
As part of the license renewal process in the District of Columbia, he informed the
board of his status in Maryland. Id. The D.C. board filed a notice of intent to revoke his
license for professional misconduct based on his "conviction" in Maryland and "for
willfully making and filing false reports" in Maryland. 558 A.2d at 331-32. Without
understanding the plea proceeding, the D.C. board inexplicably chose to ignore
evidence that the Maryland board viewed the plea and proceeding "completely
differently." Id. at 339. Particularly important for the issue in this article, the court
concluded the evidence should have been considered because the Maryland
Commission "presumably has a better understanding" of their own state law. Id.
The same is true for illness-based restrictions imposed by one state. The state which
discovered the problem can investigate and decide on appropriate action. A state can
certainly reach a different conclusion on what constitutes proper resolution. However,
if it uses another state's action as the basis for its decision, the board should understand
and consider the original state's concerns and determination. If, on the other hand, the
board does not wish to consider the first state's resolution, it should simply initiate a de
novo review.
41
See, e.g., Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984). The court acknowledged that a statutory provision "clearly
empowers" the medical board to promulgate rules to implement licensure by
endorsement. Agency interpretive rulemaking is entitled to deference. Id. at 517. 'The
challenged rule, consistent with the legislative intent of uniformity, adopts the same
passing score for endorsement" as for examination candidates. Id. at 518. The court
concluded additional criteria-minimum score and requirement all scores be obtained
at one sitting--"are reasonably related to the statutory purpose of requiring some basic
level of medical competence to assure protection of the public health, safety and
welfare." Id.
42
0ne Florida physician optimistically asserts "[e]ach state will usually look into the
reason a physician was disciplined in another state and act appropriately." Richard J.
Feinstein, Special Report the Ethics of ProfessionalRegulation, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 801,
804 (Mar. 1985). He also explains boards ask about disciplinary actions in other
jurisdictions as part of the process of licensing doctors based on examinations. An
admission of disciplinary action in another state is always investigated before a license
is granted." Id.

1994-95]

RESTRICTING MEDICAL LICESNSES

illness-based restriction to deny a license is inappropriate and violates the
ADA.
II. NATIONAL DATA BANKS

A. Federationof State Medical Boards
Sensitive to a growing national concern about bad doctors, and committed
to eliminating "individuals Senator Heinz has so appropriately called
'unethical, unfit, carpetbagging doctors,"' the Federation increased its efforts
and computerized its disciplinary data bank.43 All disciplinary actions
resulting from formal charges are "reviewed, categorized and distributed
monthly" to Federation members and Canadian provinces' licensing
authorities. 44 All member boards contribute to the data bank.
Illness-based actions which do not lead to license revocation, suspension, or
probation are probably reported under an ambiguous "health-related
problems" code.45 But, if a doctor's license is revoked, suspended, or he is
placed on probation because of illness, the only applicable code provision
seems to be "mental reasons."46 While it is certainly troubling to require reports
of any "health related problems," limiting information to only "mental
reasons"-whatever that is-is even more problematic.
In the mid 1980's, even with the Federation's national reporting
system-which physicians argued was greatly improved and still
growing-Congress feared incompetent doctors were continuing to practice
by moving to other states.
B. National PractitionerData Bank
The 1986 Health Care Quality Improvement Act was a Congressional

attempt to resolve the problem 47 and "improve the quality of medical care."48
43

Galusha Statement, supra note 14, at 54-55. The average time for disciplinary

searches is 65 seconds.
44

1d.

45

FSMB Disciplinary Coding, Miscellaneous § 415.3.

46

1d. at §§ 120, 220, 320.

47

GUIDEBOOK, supra note 22, at 1. Congress intended to overcome reluctance to
engage in meaningful peer review by granting immunity to persons who participate in
a professional review action "in the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance
of quality health care." 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(1) (1995). This part of the Act is beyond the
scope of this article. The Act also requires "a reasonable effort to obtain the facts..I.. Id.
§ 11112(a)(2). Professional review action based on disability-without investigation of
the conduct requiring the action-could invalidate the statutory immunity shield and
subject reviewers to liability. Id. § 11111(a)(1).
48
While the goal is important, new data about incidence of mental illness and its
effect on sufferers cast serious doubt on restrictions on clinical privileges imposed solely
because of disability. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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Based on "a national need" to prevent bad doctors from moving "from State to
State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous damaging or
incompetent performance," 49 Congress authorized creation of a national,
comprehensive 50 reporting system. 51 After several delays, the National
Practitioner Data Bank finally opened in 1990.52

4942 U.S.C. at 11101(2) (1995).
50
Medical boards must report license revocations, suspensions, restrictions, as well
as censures, reprimands, probation and license surrenders. 42 U.S.C. § 11132(a)(1)(A),
(B) (1995).
Health care entities must report "professional review action that adversely affects"
a doctor's clinical privileges. Id. § 11133(a)(1)(A). These entities must also report a
physician's surrender of his clinical privileges if related to, or to avoid, an investigation
into "possible incompetence or improper conduct." Id. § 11 133(a)(1)(B)(i).
Professional societies must report "review action which adversely affects the
membership of a physician in the society." Id. § 11133(a)(1)(C). "'Adversely affecting"'
is defined to include "reducing, restricting, suspending, revoking, denying, or failing to
renew clinical privileges or membership in a health care entity." 42 U.S.C. at § 11151(1).
The Act requires reporting by any entity which makes a payment settling or
partially settling, or satisfying a judgment in a malpractice claim. For purposes of this
reporting requirement, "entity"does not include an individual doctor. Although the Act
does not explicitly define the word, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia concluded Congressional intent was to limit entities to groups and
organizations and to exclude individual practitioners. American Dental Ass'n v.
Shalala, 3 F.3d 445, 446-48 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Legislators recognize that malpractice claims may be paid for many reasons
unrelated to validity of the demand. Consequently, the Act provides settlement "shall
not be construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred." 42
U.S.C. § 11137(d). However, drafters must have thought some inference was
appropriate otherwise there would beno reason to mandate reporting the information.
Nevertheless, jury instructions that reporting requirements are "'absolutely
irrelevant' to whether malpractice was committed were recently upheld. Sedlitsky v.
Pareso, 625 A.2d 71, 73 (Pa. Super. 1993) (quoting Levine v. Rosen, 616 A.2d 623, 627
(Pa. 1992)). The doctor argued that, because of mandatory reporting under the HCQIA,
this instruction "'falsely trivializes the importance of the case to the defendant
physician."' Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 10). The court conceded this federal
legislation might increase the malpractice judgment's negative impact on a doctor's
reputation but rejected his argument.
5142 U.S.C. § 11134(b) (1995). TheSecretary of Health and Human Services supervises
the system.
52
Elisabeth Ryzen, The National PractitionerData Bank Problemsand Proposed Reforms,
13 J.LEGAL MED. 409 (1992).
A 1993 General Accounting Office report identified several continuing problems
with the NPDB. See generally GENERAL AccOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY
OF HHS, HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1993). These problems include that: 1) HHS
management permits weaknesses which jeopardize "timely, secure, and cost-efficient
operation," 2) responses take several weeks which delays the granting of privileges, 3)
inadequate internal controls allowed "sensitive practitioner data" to be sent to
organizations not entitled to the information, 4) HHS failure to properly monitor the
data bank contractor permitted automated system problems to continue, and 5) HHS
plans to redesign the data bank "have not incorporated a sound system development
approach and are based on funding uncertainties." Id. at 2-3. Most troublesome for the
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The Act requires medical boards report any action which "revokes or
suspends (or otherwise restricts) a physician's license."53 Combined with
severe penalties for failing to comply with mandatory reporting,54 this
ambiguous "otherwise restricts" language may cause boards to err5 5 on the side
of reporting.-% Nevertheless, when boards report any restriction, including

issue in this article, of course, is the inappropriate release of sensitive physician
information to unauthorized entities.
The Data Bank received 3,462,297 queries and 82,623 reports of malpractice
payments or adverse actions by April, 1994. U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK PROFILE OF MATCHES UPDATE, OEI-01-94-00031
(1994). When there is a query about a practitioner against whom a report has been filed
it is called a "match." By April, 1994, there were 152,941 matches. In fact, by February,
1994, therewerealmost seven times as many matches as there had been two years earlier.
Id. Approximately half of the matches of adverse action reports were filed by state
licensing boards.Further, the percentage of interstate matches increased from 9.3 to 15.3.
Id. at 2. See also Use of National PractitionerData Bank, Number of Matches Growing, HHS
InspectorGeneral Says, 5 MCR 33 d8 (BNA Medicare Report Aug. 19, 1994).
5342 U.S.C. § 11132(a)(1)(A) (1995).
"Reportable actions must be based on reasons relating to professional competence
or professional conduct which affects or could adversely affect the health or welfare of
a patient. Matters not related to the professional competence or professional conduct of
a [practitioner] are not to be reported to the Data Bank." GUIDEBOOK, supra note 22, at
17.
In fact, during the notice and comment period, a majority of the comments on
reporting licensure actions criticized disclosing actions unrelated to professional
conduct or competence. Id. at app. C (citing 45 C.F.R. Part 60). Acknowledging the
purpose of the Data Bank is to prevent incompetent physicians from moving to a new
location where their past bad practices are not known, the response was "the Secretary
intends to collect only data relating to professional competence or misconduct." Id.,
(citing 54 Fed. Reg. 42,722, 42,726 (1989)).
54 The Secretary will replace boards which fail to comply with another qualified entity
for reporting. 42 U.S.C. § 11132(b) (1988). Health care entities which do not report face
loss of the statutory immunity protection. Id. at § 11133(c)(1).
55

Adverse action reports must be submitted on forms supplied by the National
Practitioner Data Bank. Entities must choose a classification code. Although an entity
may explain the action, it can only use up to 600 characters, including punctuation and
spaces. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 22, at app. D.
A board which restricts a license without revokhg, suspending, or imposing
probation on the physician must report under the five digit code classification for"Other
Miscellaneous Action (Including Censure and Surrender)." ADVERSE ACTION
CLASSIFICATIONCODES, NPDB FORM. The form also permits the board to provide a "brief

description of the acts or omissions, or other reasons for the adverse action taken." Id.
at § C.31. In licensure actions, a portion of the extremely limited space must be used to
describe the state medical board. Combining an ambiguous classification code with an
insufficient opportunity to explain magnifies the potential for misunderstanding and
bad results.
56
Based on the "lack of uniformity" in state laws which regulate doctors, one
physician noted the "remarkable variability in thereportingof adverse actions involving
practitioners' licensure ... should be expected." Bernard S. Goffen, Letters, the National
Practitioner Data Bank: Bane or Benefit?, 268 JAMA 3429 (1992). Because sources
demonstrated a "glaring absence of conformity," Doctor Goffen proposed creating
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those based only on illness, 57 they are submitting non-reportable information
and incorrectly implying that sickness necessarily suggests incompetence. This
not only exceeds HCQIA requirements, and improperly infringes upon the
doctor's right to privacy, it violates the ADA.
C. Right to Privacy
Courts have little difficulty rebuffing right to privacy objections to disclosure
of a doctor's medical history. Because the right to privacy is not absolute, courts
balance the physician's right against the state's interest. 58 A California court

acknowledged the privacy right "encompasses mental privacy, including
thought, emotions, expressions, and personality."59 Nevertheless, the court

upheld a statute permitting the board to order physicians whose ability to
practice is impaired due to mental illness to submit to psychiatric examinations.
The court balanced the individual's privacy interest against the state's
"compelling need to protect the public against risk of harm by physicians who
are so impaired they cannot practice medicine safely."60 The statute survived

"national standards for validity, comparability, and acceptability." Otherwise, Dr.
Goffen feared, the NPDB might experience consequences of "'garbage in, garbage out.'"
Id.
Doctors and other professionals concurred in Dr. Goffen's concerns but disagreed
with his conclusion. They argued the differences were a function of "the variability in
practice relating to disciplinary actions and reporting" rather than quality of physicians
in a particular location. Fitzhugh Mullan et al., In Reply, 268 JAMA 3430 (1992). These
physicians suggest that, because boards retain the task of assessing information
received, they should develop "rigorous and uniform [national] standards."
Another physician objected to the "methods used and extreme potential for abuse,"
based on absence of information "as to what is admissible or pertinent." Michael Dube,
Letters, 268 JAMA 3429 (1992). The reply referred to the one hundred page NPDB
guidebook and supplement. In Reply, at 3430
Commentators have also objected that classification codes and limitations on
descriptions may "lead to inaccuracies in reporting." Ilene D. Johnson, Reports to the
National PractitionerData Bank, 265 JAMA 407, 410 (1991).
57

Prior to the HCQIA, actions based on professional impairment represented only a
small percentage of sanctions reported. Walzer, supranote 35, at 135. The explanation
is, according to Dr. Walzer, once identified, most impaired physicians succumbed to a
board's "coercive effort to intervene." Id. Intervention refers to "advocacy-oriented
confrontation of an impaired physician, often by trained physician intervenors, upon
probable cause based on information from reliable reports." Id. at 138. So long as the
physician submitted to the intervention, information remained confidential. As a result,
"[o]nly uncooperative impaired physicians" were formally disciplined and reported. Id.
at 135. Nevertheless, although more than forty states explicitly authorize boards or
medical societies to investigate and rehabilitate rather than sanction impaired
physicians, the extent of confidentiality varies. Walzer, supra note 35 at 139-68.
58
E.g., Humenansky, 525 N.W.2d at 567.
59

Kees v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112, 119 (Cal. App.
1992).
60

1d.
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constitutional challenge because the court interpreted the provision to only
allow psychiatric examinations "if such an examination is the least intrusive
means of determining a physician's mental condition. "61
The South Carolina Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion. 62 Despite
a federal statute providing confidentiality for substance abuse program
participants, the court granted a board petition for disclosure of a doctor's
medical records. The court conceded "potential harm to the physician, the
physician-patient relationship, and the treatment services." 63 Nevertheless, the
court agreed with the board's argument "that it is virtually impossible to
conceive of a situation which would pose a greater threat to life or serious
bodily harm than a physician practicing under the influence of drugs. "64 Under
those circumstances, the need for disclosure as part of a confidential board
investigation outweighs the potential harm. 65 The balance should shift,
however, when reporting illness-based restrictions. Sick doctors who are not
impaired, pose no additional risk to the public.
Additionally, the South Carolina court was clearly influenced by the
safeguards against unnecessary disclosure of confidential information.66 The
NPDB collects and disseminates private information. Although access to this
sensitive material is supposed to be limited, inadequate safeguards and
inappropriate disclosure of confidential information are recurring criticisms of
the Data Bank. 67
When boards move from appropriate inquiry about impairment to improper
questions about illness, courts must reweigh individual versus state interests.
The threat to confidentiality posed by national data banks increases the
potential infringement of the doctor's right to privacy. But, even if courts
continue to reject privacy claims, illness-based restrictions cannot survive
challenges under the ADA.

61

[d.

62

State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Fenwick Hall, 419 S.E.2d 222 (S.C. 1992).

63

d. at 224.
64id.
65
66

d.

'The Board in conducting its investigation would retain the confidentiality of the
records." 419 S.E.2d at 224.
67
See supra note 52.
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III. AMERICANS WITH DISABILmEs ACT
69
68
The ADA was passed to protect 43 million Americans with disabilities
from discrimination resulting from "society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability." 70 Recognizing that people with disabilities "continually
encounter various forms of discrimination.., and relegation to lesser... jobs,
or other opportunities,"71 Congress attempted to eliminate this
discrimination. 72 Limiting a physician's license merely because he is
sick-rather than determining if he is impaired and thus needs restrictions to
be able to practice with skill and safety 73-represents impermissible
discrimination. In fact, recent medical research demonstrates a board might

68

More recent estimates are that 49 million Americans are disabled. JOHN M. MCNEIL,

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 1991-92, DATA FROM THE SURVEY OF INCOME AND
PROGRAM PARTICIPATION5 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Pub.

No. P70-33 1993) cited in Peter David Blanck, Employment Integration, Economic
Opportunity,and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: EmpiricalStudyfrom 1990-93,79 IOWA
L. REV. 853, 854-55 (1994).
69
TheADA provides protection for qualified individuals with a disability. Disability
includes not only"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities" but also "a record of such impairment" or "being regarded as
having such impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1995). This means the Act covers
physicians who suffer from or have a history of mental illness. But, the ADA also
protects those who are merely "regarded as" disabled. By using illness as a criterion for
restricting licenses, boards regard these doctors as disabled.
Substance abusers are a particular problem. In fact, "violations involving drugs or
alcohol seem to account for three-fourths or more of all disciplinary actions."
Havighurst, supra note 12, at 401. The ADA specifically does not protect current drug
users because a current user is not a qualified individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (1995).
Although not explicit, the Act appears to treat current alcohol abusers similarly.
However, people who are no longer substance abusers, or those who were merely
"regarded as" using drugs, are protected. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b).
70

Schoolboard of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,284 (1987).

7142 U.S.C. § 12101(5) (1995).
72
"The ADA establishes a clear, comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of one's disability and provides a national mandate with strong enforceable
standards to bring the disabled into the mainstream of American life." Rivera Flores v.
Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 776 F. Supp. 61, 69 (D.P.R. 1991).

73 Using studies conducted over several decades, one commentator argues many
illegal drug users "function effectively at work and in other areas of social life." Charles
Winick, Social Behavior, Public.Policy,and Nonharmful DrugUse, 69 MILBANKQ. 437 (1991).
Dr. Winick conceded that drug dependent physicians are "especially troubling."
Nevertheless, he claimed, "[t]here areno reportsdemonstrating that addictedphysicians
are more likely to commit malpractice than others." Id. at 441. In fact, according to the
country's largest program for addicted health care providers, a doctor's professional
activities are "the last aspect of his or her life to be affected by drug dependence." Id.
(citing G.D. Talbott and C. Wright, Chemical Dependency in Health Care Professionals,2
OCCUPATIONAL MED. ST. OF THE ART REVIEW 581 (1987)). Contrary to the common
perception, Dr. Winick concluded drug addicted doctors "typically have successful and
active primary care practices." Id.
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grant a license it "otherwise restricts" to sick people who may never be impaired
or pose increased risk to patients. 74 By confusing illness with impairment,
boards act contrary to the purpose of the ADA and improperly relegate these
individuals to "lesser ... opportunities."

Further, the ADA raises people with disabilities to suspect class status. 75
Therefore, to continue to impose and report illness-based restrictions, boards
must demonstrate these actions pass the strict scrutiny test. Although boards
can show a compelling state interest in protecting the public from incompetent
physicians, imposing and reporting illness-based restrictions is not narrowly
tailored to effectuate that interest. As a result-these restrictions and the
reports--violate the ADA. 76
A. Protection Under the ADA
Title I177 regulations prohibit public entities from administering "a licensing
or certification program in a manner that subjects qualified individuals with
74

Boards generally do not have to establish that a doctor's practice represents an

"actual threat of harm" to his patients or the public to revoke his license. In re Guess, 393

S.E.2d 833,836 (N.C. 1990). Instead, "a general risk of endangering the public is inherent
in any practices which fail to conform to the standards of 'acceptable and prevailing'
medical practices." Id. at 837. This is because preventing deviation from the standard,
regardless of potential injury, is rationally related to protecting the public from "'the
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud."' Id.,
(quoting Dent, 129 U.S. at 122).
Absent a fundamental right or suspect class, this is the appropriate test for most
license restrictions. However, the level of scrutiny is different when the limitation is
based on disability. Under the ADA, boards must establish licensees represent a "direct
threat" before restriction based on disability is appropriate. Mary Anne Bobinski,
Autonomy and Privacy: ProtectingPatients From Their Physicians, 55 U. PITr. L. REV. 291,
320(1994).
7542 U.S.C. § 12101(7) (1995).
76

Other challenges to these restrictions have failed. Limitations on who may query
the Data Bank---state licensing boards, hospitals, and other health care entities-are
probably sufficient to overcome a physician's constitutional challenges to this invasion
of privacy. See Bobinski, supra note 74, at 333-39, for a discussion of constitutional
challenges to disclosure of private physician information.
Although courts recognize a physician's interest in his reputation, these claims
have also been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that "Data Bank
reporting requirements have a direct effect on the professional life of a physician,
particularly since there is no provision for the removal of information once provided."
Nolan N. Atkinson Jr., How the National PractitionerData Bank Affects Medical Malpractice
Clients, 5:1 THE PRACTICAL LITIGATOR 35-38 (1994).

The Act provides some protections to insure the information in the Data Bank is
correct. For example, the physician may request disclosure of reported information.
Further, the Act requires the Secretary establish procedures for disputing the accuracy
of the information. 42 U.S.C. § 11136(1), (2) (1995).
77
The Act is divided into several parts. The provisions relevant to this article are
found in the preliminary statement of the purpose to establish a national commitment
to eliminate discrimination, Title I which prohibits discrimination in employment and
Title II which extends protection to benefits provided by a public entity. A discussion
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disabilities to discrimination based on disability...."-78 Public entities include
"any ...instrumentality of a state."79 Medical boards, acting as agents of the
state,8 0 are public entities. Impermissible discrimination includes "limiting,
segregating, or classifying" a disabled person based on his disability.81
When boards withhold licenses or impose restrictions-such as monitoring
or mandatory continued participation in a substance abuse program-based
solely on sickness or past drug or alcohol abuse, they violate the ADA by
"limiting" the licensee and adversely affecting his status or opportunity because
they regard him as disabled. Indeed, public entities should not even ask about
illnesses. 82 Instead, their only legitimate concern is whether "with or without
reasonable modifications" the licensee meets "essential eligibility requirements
for... participation in programs or activities" provided by the board. 83
Moreover, the Act places the burden of proof on boards. They must prove
essential licensure requirements and justify the need for specific discriminatory
methods. Although a board's decision on what constitutes "essential eligibility
requirements" is "entitled to some deference in view of its experience and
knowledge," 84 the criteria cannot impose additional, unnecessary burdens on
qualified individuals with disabilities.
Using disease as a criterion violates this rule.85 Boards use disability to
impose the additional burden of a restricted license requiring monitoring or

of Title III on public accommodations, Title IV on telecommunications, and
miscellaneous provisions in Title V is beyond the scope of this article.
7828 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (1994).
7942 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b) (1995).
8
0See supra text accompanying note 19. Indeed, the NATIONAL PRACrITIONER DATA
BANK GUIDEBOOK defines Board of Medical Examiners as "a body or subdivision of such
body which is designated by a State for the purpose of licensing, monitoring and

discipliningphysicians ...
includes..

a composite board, a subdivision, or an equivalent

body as determined by the State." GUIDEBOOK, supra note 22, at 47.
8142 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (1995).
82

See generallyColeman and Shellow, supra note 4.

8342 U.S.C.
84

§ 12131(2) (1995).

Medical Society of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. 93-36-70,1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14294, at*16-17
(D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993), mcdified, Medical Society of N.J. v. Jacobs, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15261 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 1994).
85
This does not mean, of course, that mental illness or substance abuse protects a
doctor from board action. Boards may restrict or revoke a license if the physician's illness
manifests in conduct which might injure a patient, even if no patient has been harmed.
The restriction would be appropriate and permissible under the ADA so long as it was
based on the doctor's conduct-whatever its cause-rather than illness. For example, a
physician's public intoxication, fight and violent acts in resisting arrest in a "state of
undress on the street"-in addition to her previous substance abuse problems-were
properconsiderations in decidingwhether to re-imposeprobation. Majorv. Department
of Professional Regulation, 531 So. 2d 411,412 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1988). "Based on proof
of such conduct," the board decided Dr. Major was unable to practice with skill and
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participation in an impaired physician's program. Because there simply is no
proof that history of mental illness or substance abuse prevents licensees from
possessing essential requirements to practice with skill and safety,86 these
additional burdens are unnecessary.
In fact, most mental illnesses never cause functional impairment. According
to a National Institute of Mental Health study, while about 28 percent8 7 of the
population suffer from mental illness, approximately two-thirds of these sick
people are not impaired by their psychiatric condition.88 Thus, illness-based
restrictions are unnecessary except to further prejudice against people with
disabilities that the ADA was passed to eliminate. Fortunately, courts are
89
beginning to agree and recognize impairment, rather than illness, is the issue.

safety. Id. at 413 (emphasis added). The board concluded the "fact that no patient harm
occurred was fortuitous." Id.
86
A non-physician consultant to the West Virginia impaired physician program
objected to a board press release identifying three doctors whose licenseswere restricted
based on substance abuse. H. Wayne Dickison, Peer Assistance, Not PublicIdentification,
85 W. VA. MED. J.390 (1989). 'To single out a physician who has voluntarily sought help
for a treatable illness because that illness involves drug or alcohol misuse is
discriminatory to say the least. There is ample evidence to show that such physicians
present no greater risk to patient care than a physician treated for any other chronic
medical problem." Id.
87

This number includes substance abusers. See generally D.A. Regier et al., The NIMH
EpidemiologicCatchment Area Program,41 ARCHIVES OF GEN.PSYCHIATRY 934 (1984).
88

The numbers should be approximately the same for doctors as for the rest of the
population. In a recent study, the authors concluded doctors were as likely as others in
their age and peer groups to experiment with illegal drugs during theirlifetimes. Patrick
H. Hughes et al., Prevalence of Substance Use Among US Physicians,267 JAMA 2333 (1992).
Although physicians were less likely to currently be using illicit substances, they
reported a higher incidence of alcohol abuse than the general population. The
researchers suggested increased use of alcohol was likely attributable to socio-economic
status, rather than profession. Physicians were also more likely to use some types of
prescription drugs, presumably because of a high rate of self treatment with controlled
medications. Estimates of number of doctors sanctioned by state licensing boards and
treated in impaired physician programs vary between one and three percent.
Alcoholism is "slightly more prevalent" than drug abuse. Id. at 2338. But this does not
mean, according to the authors, that doctors treat patients when they are intoxicated or
drug impaired. Id. at 2333-38.
Nevertheless, while the number may be small, some physicians engage in high risk
behavior. "The challenge is to identify these physicians early and help them avoid the
adverse effects of substance abuse and dependence." Id. at 2338. The authors suggest a
shift in focus to concern for the doctor and away from punishment and judgment
provides one reason for high success rates reported by some state medical society
treatment programs. Id. at 2338-39.
89

Jacobs, 1993 US. Dist. LEXIS, at *20. "The essential problem with the present
questions is that they substitute an impermissible inquiry into the status of disabled
applicants for the proper, indeed necessary, inquiry into the applicant's behavior." Id.
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B. ProvidingTitle I Protections
Title II explicitly prohibits discrimination but provides only broad outlines
rather than specifics. By contrast, Title I-which prevents discrimination in
employment-is much more detailed.
Although medical boards are not technically employers, they should be
required to comply with Title I protections for several reasons. First, the ADA
was designed to expand protection for persons with disabilities. Consequently,
consistent with legislative intent, any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
greater-rather than lesser-protection. 90 Second, board action affects a
physician's employment situation. For example, license restrictions influence
clinical and hospital staff privileges. 91 Some restrictions may even have a direct
impact on the doctor-patient relationship. Third, ADA regulations and
Interpretive Guidance state Title I protections apply to Title 11.92 Finally, even
if Title I protections are not applicable to all Title II services and benefits, they
should apply to professional licensing boards because they are appropriate and
93
necessary.
The New Jersey medical board recently agreed. The board analogized
relicensure to an employment situation, thereby conceding at least some Title
I protections apply to its activities. The board's argument for continued use of
mental health inquiries on relicensure applications 94 rested on the hypothesis

90
See, e.g., Robert W. Edwards, Note, The Rightsof Students with LearningDisabilities
and the Responsibilities of Institutions of Higher Education under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 2 J.L. &POUv 213,215 (1994); Sidney D. Watson, EliminatingFearThrough
Comparative Risk: Docs, Aids, and the Anti-DiscriminationIdeal, 40 BuFF. L. REV. 739, 768
(1982).

91Physicians must have access to hospitals. Doctors need staff privileges to admit
patients and use hospital resources. Josephine M. Hammack, Note, The Antitrust Laws
and Medical Peer Review Process, 9 J.CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. POL'Y 419 (1993). The HCQIA
requires hospitals query the Data Bank when a physician "applies to be on the medical
staff (courtesy or otherwise)" or for clinical privileges. Hospitals must also query the
Data Bank every two years concerning any physician on staff or with clinical privileges.
Hospitals may request information at other times. 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a) (1995).
The Act specifically immunizes hospitals from liability if they rely on false
information provided by the Data Bank unless the hospital knew it was false. Id. at §
11135(c).
9228 C.F.R. § 35.103(a). See Judiciary Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 84 (1990). But seeJacobs,1993 No.93-3670, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14294,
at "14-19, (where the court reviews several regulations which create ambiguity on this
issue).
93Many of the specific protections are not necessary for some public services and
benefits, such as use ofparks andpublic buildings. Chai Feldblum, MedicalExaminations
and Inquiries Under The Americans With DisabilitiesAct: A View From The Inside, 64 TEMP.
L.Q. 521 (1991). However, this does not mean the protections should not be available
for those services to which they are appropriate.
94

Jacobs, 1993 No. 93-3670, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14294.
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that obtaining a license is akin to being hired for a job. 95 Committee reports
"produce an ambiguous picture" as to whether Congress intended to
incorporate Title I "in its entirety" into Title I1.96 Nevertheless, the court avoided
deciding the issue because plaintiff was only seeking a preliminary
97
injunction.
IV.BOARD DECISIONS

A few egregious decisions illustrate that some boards are victims of the
prejudice against sick people that the ADA was enacted to prevent. Boards
make this mistake at each point in the process. 98 This is particularly troubling
because, as is generally true, regulatory agencies and licensing boards which
act for them are granted great deference. 99 As a result, board decisions are
upheld unless arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion.lOO Some
board decisions exceed even this broad scope. Although these bad results
would probably be reversed if challenged, they still cause unnecessary harm:
the physician suffers without compensation and the public does not benefit.
For example, in one particularly outrageous case, the Arkansas medical
board imposed a one year probation based on a physician's attempted
suicide. 101 The board contended Dr. John Young's suicide attempt constituted
"unprofessional conduct by becoming physically or mentally incompetent to
practice medicine to such an extent as to endanger the public."102 However, the
board failed to produce any evidence that the suicide attempt rendered Dr.
Young incompetent so as to endanger the public. Indeed, the only evidence the
board presented was Dr. Young's admission of his serious suicide attempt and

95

1d. at *24.

96

1d. at *26.

97

Although the judge determined plaintiff had a high probability of success on the

merits to invalidate mental health inquiries, the preliminary injunction was denied
absent a showing of irreparable harm. Id. at *27, *32.
98

Initial licensing decisions are beyond the scope of this article. See Coleman &

Shellow, supra note 4.
99

Physician,Heal Thyself, supra note 9, at 1080.

100

See, e.g., Borden v. Division of Med. Quality, No. 0018801, 1994 Cal. App. LEXIS
1239, *20 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1994).
A board abuses its discretion if it "'has not proceeded in the manner required by
law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not
supported by the evidence."' Williamson, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (quoting § 1094.5(b) Calif.
Code of Civil Procedure).
101
Arkansas State Medical Bd. v. Young, No. CA 93-905, 1994 Ark. App. LEXIS 407,
*5(Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 7,1994).
102 Id. at *3.
Arkansas statutes permit the board to sanction a physician for such
unprofessional conduct. Id. at *2-3 (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 17-93-409 (10) (1987). The
board initiated the disciplinary proceeding when Dr. Young admitted he attempted to
kill himself by overdosing on a antidepressant. Id. at *2).
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hospital records stating he had been found at home after taking an
undetermined amount of drugs.
In contrast, Dr. Young introduced evidence to show he was competent and
not a danger to the public. He testified since his suicide attempt he had been
treated by a psychiatrist and continued to receive therapy from a psychologist.
Dr. Young also testified he had not returned to work until his therapist
approved, "had never had a drug or alcohol problem, that he is not on any
medication, and that he has never done anything which would harm a
patient."103 In addition, he assured the board he was no longer suicidal and
was "glad to be alive."104 Letters from his psychiatrist, psychologist, and five
other physicians fully supported his testimony.
Thus, according to the court, the "undisputed evidence presented" was that
Dr. Young was competent.105 Nevertheless, the board placed him on probation.
Even worse, when Dr. Young successfully petitioned the circuit court to set
aside that decision, the board appealed, further delaying resolution. For almost
three years, 106 Dr. Young's professional status was unclear because a state
medical board based its decision on outdated myths and stereotypes about
mental illness.
A Florida case illustrates a board's inappropriate use of disciplinary action
107
from another state and a "gross abuse of its discretion" in denying a license.
Dr. M. Carl Nest had voluntarily surrendered his New York license in 1979 after
attempting, while intoxicated, to treat four patients. He moved to Florida and
eventually successfully completed treatment for his alcoholism. 108
The Florida board responded to Dr. Nest's application for licensure by
requesting reports from his physician and requiring an independent
evaluation. Despite recommendations by both that Dr. Nest be granted a license
conditioned on treatment and attendance at AA, the board rejected his
application. 109 The final order "relied exclusively" on Dr. Nest's New York
experience to conclude he had failed to demonstrate his ability to practice with
skill and safety. The order provided he could reapply in Florida if his New York
license was reinstated.11 0

1031994 Ark. App. LEXIS 407 at *4.
104

Id.

105

d.

106

Dr. Young attempted suicide in January, 1992. The Arkansas appellate court did
not decide until September, 1994, that-without more--using the suicide attempt as the
basis for probation was improper. Id. at *4.
107
Nest v. Department of Professional Regulation, 490 So. 2d 987, 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
108
1d. He also passed a national medical examination which was a requirement for a
license in Florida. Id.
109

1d. at 989.

110490 So.2d at 988.
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Dr. Nest attended a University of Florida School of Medicine clinical
refresher course. He also contacted the "'Doctors' Recovery Network"' and
joined their International Doctors of Alcoholics Anonymous group. He
requested and was granted a formal hearing. In an extensive pre-hearing
stipulation, the parties agreed there was "no dispute regarding Dr. Nest's
qualifications for medical licensure in Florida, or regarding the adequacy of his
clinical skills, except insofar as his past alcohol impairment impacted on those
skills."111 All doctors who had treated or evaluated Dr. Nest, including a
member of the Florida Medical Association's Impaired Physician's Committee,
plus several experts in drug and alcohol treatment, testified he could practice
with skill and safety. Without introducing any contradictory evidence, the
board rested its case. 112
The hearing officer concluded that "Dr. Nest had amply demonstrated his
ability to practice safely, [and] ... recommended he be licensed and placed on
two years probation."113 Despite the board counsel's strong recommendation
that the hearing officer's order be adopted, the board altered the hearing
114
officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied the application.
The Florida appellate court reversed. The ability to practice safely is
ultimately an issue of fact. Therefore, because "competent substantial evidence
in the record" supported the hearing officer, the board was not free to replace
these findings with its own. 115 Because the record contained no evidence that
Dr. Nest could not practice safely-and because the hearing officer, the board's
lawyer and consultant all recommended licensure-denial "can only be
116
characterized as an abuse of agency discretion."
This board's stubborn refusal to focus on current ability to practice with skill
and safety in favor of a myopic fixation on past addiction is puzzling.
A North Carolina decision provides an example of abuse of discretion in
denying a physician reinstatement of his license.11 7 Dr. Archibald Carter
Magee's license was automatically suspended when he was adjudicated
mentally incompetent. The adjudication was based on his plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity. This plea to a criminal assault charge was accepted and, due

111Id.
112Jd.
113

1d. at 989. The hearing officer conceded theboard had discretion to deny the license
because Dr. Nest's past impairment constituted statutory grounds for discipline.
Nevertheless, he concluded denying the license would be an abuse of discretion. The
statute requires the board to permit impaired physicians to prove they can return to
practice without risk to patients. 490 So.2d at 989.
114
/d.
115/d.
11 6

Id. at 990.

117

In re Magee, 362 S.E.2d 564 (N.C. App. 1987).
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to his drug and alcohol abuse, Dr. Magee was involuntarily committed to a
118
psychiatric hospital.
After months of hospitalization, Dr. Magee was found competent and
released. He sought reinstatement of his license. Even though Dr. Magee
responded to the board's request and submitted psychiatrists' statements of his
mental competence, his application was rejected. 119
The appellate court found the board denied Dr. Magee procedural due
process. 12 0 The board led him to believe reinstatement depended on proof of
mental competence but rejected his application on three other grounds,
without giving Dr. Magee notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard. The
court also disagreed with the board's claim to "complete statutory discretion
to deny or limit" a license once a doctor's practice has been terminated. 121 The
court remanded to the board for a hearing de novo because "nothing" in the
statutes "would allow the Board to continue, either permanently or indefinitely,
the deprivation of a license, begun as an automatic suspension for mental
incompetency, upon totally different grounds, without notice of those grounds
or an opportunity to be heard. 122
Most of the cases predate the National Practitioner Data Bank. As more
information about license restrictions becomes available, an increase in bad
results is predictable.
V. IMPAIRED PHYSICIANS

12 3

Boards must stop confusing illness with impairment when imposing
restrictions. 124 Physicians who suffer from illness are sick. They are not

11 8

1d. at 565.

9

11 1d. The psychiatrist he was seeing at the time recommended licensure with
conditions, such as regular attendance at AA for life and outpatient psychiatric
treatment for one year. Nevertheless, without notice or a hearing, the board refused to
reinstate Dr. Magee's license. Id.

Dr. Magee's request for a formal hearing was granted. But, despite testimony
concerning his mental competence and efforts at rehabilitation, the board refused
reinstatement based on his history. On review, the court ordered the case remanded for
hearing de novo in accordance with procedures the board should adopt. 362 S.E.2d at
565. After judicial review remanding for a board hearing de novo, a signed order
concluding Dr. Magee's constitutional rights had been violated and an amended order,
both sides appealed. However, because Dr. Magee failed to properly raise or argue his
assignments of error, the court considered only the board's issues. Id. at 566.
1201d. at 566-67.
121

d. at 567.

122362 S.E. 2d at 568.
12 3

The first national discussion of impairment caused by alcoholism and drug abuse

occurred during a 1975 AMA symposium. At that time only five states had impaired
physician programs. All five were completely volunteer. By 1988, every state had some
sort of program. S. Lon Connor, Comparisonof Impaired PhysicianProgramsNationwide,
37 MD. MED. J. 213 (1988).
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necessarily impaired. Impairment involves "the loss of a function, where a
person's ability to practice is diminished in value, strength, quality, or
excellence." 125 In other words, a sick doctor is only an impaired physician when
his illness adversely affects his ability to practice. A physician's license should
only be restricted if he is impaired.
Impaired physician programs 126 serve two critical functions: 1) protecting
the public welfare and 2) restoring sick colleagues to good health. 127 Medical
124
The AMA Model Impaired Physician Act avoids this trap. The model legislation
"clearly distinguishes impairment caused by alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness
from professional incompetence." The Impaired HealthProfessional,supra note 35, at 259.
A recent AMA Council on Medical Education Report also recognized that the issue
is impairment. The Council recommended physician evaluations "inquire only into
illness or disabilities that may reasonably be expected to affect a physician's current
competence to practice medicine." Hugh E. Stephenson, Jr., SELF-INCRIMINATING

QUESTIONS ON LICENSING APPLICATIONS, AMA COUNCIL ON MEDICAL EDUCATION REPORT

10,1-94 at 5 (amending Policy 275.978(9)).
125
The Impaired Health Professional,supra note 35, at 252.
126 Although most programs include psychiatric disorders, many devote more
attention to substance abusers. For example, in Kentucky, seven (5.2%) of the 134
physicians referred to the Impaired Physician's Committee (IPC) between 1979 and
1990, were referred based solely on psychiatric problems. These included
"schizophrenia, paranoid depression, or manic-depressive disorders." Richard D.
Blondell, ImpairedPhysicians:The Kentucky Experience, 90 J. KY. MED. AssN 62,65 (1994).
An additional six physicians (4.5%) were referred because of "possible organic
impairment (e.g., dementia)." Id. These data obviously predate the 1990 ADA. Persons
suffering from all these illnesses now enjoy the Act's protections. The great majority of
referrals (107 doctors representing 81.3%) resulted from suspected substance abuse. Id.
The ADA expressly excludes current substance abusers.
Other jurisdictions agree "chemical dependency remains the leading cause of
impairment." However, they report a greater percentage-between 6 and 20%-of
"[ilmpairment due to mental illness without concurrent chemical dependency." David
G. Benzer, Healing the healer: a primer an physician impairment, 1991(2) WIS. MED. J. 70.
According to Dr. Benzer, the director of the Wisconsin impaired physician program,
"[i]t is unclear" whether the disparity results from "a lesser incidence of psychiatric
illness as the source of the impairment.... or less willingness on the part of colleagues
to report physicians with psychiatric illness." Id. Interestingly, Dr. Benzer reports
approximately the same percentage (82%) of physicians involved in the Wisconsin
program because of substance abuse problems. Id. at 73.
Dr. Benzer raises another important issue. Although physical illness is correctly
included in the AMA definition of impairment, most of the literature ignores physical
disorders. Id. This omission is revealing. It supports and perpetuates myths about and
prejudice against the mentally ill.
In fact, two-thirds of the 30 state society programs responding to a 1986 AMA study
treat some major psychiatric disorders. The ImpairedHealth Professional,supra note 35, at
254 (citing E. Steindler, Impaired Health Professionals:State of the Art, 36 MD. MED. J. 217
(1987)). Nevertheless, the focus continues to be substance abuse. Id. It is interesting to
note some states have developed programs for "compulsive gambling, sexual
exploitation of patients, and treatment of general psychiatric disorders without
substance or alcohol abuse." Id.
Further, programs which focus only on substance abuse are losing an opportunity
to help more physicians who are in trouble. According to at least one commentator,
despite a "relative paucity" in the literature of information concerning physician
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professionals have other reasons to create and implement these programs for
colleagues. By helping assure physician competence and reliability, they
maintain and enhance professionalism. 128 Further, they preserve the enormous
societal investment in the physician's medical training. Programs must
"maintain a balance between concern for colleagues as human beings and
2
concern for public safety."1

9

recovery from mental illness other than substance abuse, "in general the prognosis and
recovery rates are worse than for chemical dependency." Michael Centrella, Physician
Addiction andImpairment-CurrentThinking: A Review, 13(1) J. ADDICTivE DISEASES 91,98
(1994). This raises the questionwhether theapparentgap in providing assistance creates
the disparate results. Alternative explanations include that the prognosis and recovery
for substance abusers is generally higher or that intervention is usually more successful.
127 Emmanuel M. Steindler, Impaired Health Professionals:State of the Art, 36 MD. MED.
J. 217 (Mar. 1987). All states have established an impaired physician policy and
committee. Centrella, supra note 126, at 100. Impaired physician treatment programs
were created to assure patient welfare. Another goal "of equal importance" is "saving
the life of colleagues and restoring them to good health both personally and
professionally." Id. at 101.
128
The AMA Council on Mental Health suggests organized medicine's "paramount
responsibility" is accountability for assuring competent health care. Council on Mental
Health, The Sick Physician Impairment by PsychiatricDisorders, including Alcoholism and
Drug Dependence, 223 JAMA 684 (1973). Impaired physicians-doctors "whose
functioning has been impaired by psychiatric disorders, including alcoholism and drug
dependence"-occasionally jeopardize this responsibility. Therefore, the Council
recommended referrals to medical society or board committees created specifically to
decide whether the doctor "is suffering from a disorder to a degree that interferes with
his ability to practice medicine." Id.
In fact, the Council concluded physicians have an ethical responsibility to be aware
of another doctor's "inability to practice medicine adequately by reason of physical or
mental illness, including alcoholism or drug dependence." Id.
129 Steindler, supra note 127, at 220. Emmanuel Steindler, Executive Director,
American Medical Society on Alcoholism and Other Drug Dependencies, fears a "swing
toward a more punitive climate," makes the balance more difficult; nevertheless,
"maintain the balance they must." Id.
Not surprisingly, different types of programs have evolved to respond to this very
complex problem of impaired physicians. Edward T. Carden, Whither the Impaired
Physician? The Politics of Impairment, 37 MD. MED. J. 206, 206-08 (1988). Controversy
continues over the most effective organization. Nine states legislate programs. Of these,
two are administered by state boards, or by independent agencies, and three by medical
societies which contract with the board. Medical societies administer all remaining state
programs. Richard Ikeda & Chet Pelton, Diversion ProgransforImpaired Physicians, 152
WEST. J. MED. 617 (May, 1990).
One study evaluated 100 doctors successfully treated in programs of professional
psychotherapy and peer-led self help groups. All reported Alcoholics Anonymous was
more important to their recovery. See generally Marc Galanter et al., CombinedAlcoholics
Anonymous and Professional Carefor Addicted Physicians, 147 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 64
(1990). No system is perfect. Concern about licensure action may reduce the efficacy of
programs administered by state boards. These fears may prevent physicians from
joining voluntarily. On the other hand, the close coordination with the licensing and
disciplinary board is presumed to enhance public protection.

1994-95]

RESTRICTING MEDICAL LICESNSES

Unfortunately, impaired physician programs and committees frequently fail
to distinguish between sick and impaired doctors. Periaps part of the difficulty
results from the name "impaired" physician program Although participants
may be sick, many are not impaired. Both sick and impaired doctors might
benefit from, or even need, treatment, but the issue for licensing boards is only
the effect of the physician's illness on his patients. As a result, the public
interest-and thus the board's-is very different depending on whether the
sick doctor is also impaired. Certainly, for his own well being any physician
whose illness requires treatment should get help-either from an impaired
physician program or appropriate professional. However, the only reason for
a board to require treatment or restrict a doctor's license is if his illness affects
his patients.
On the other hand, when an illness-or any other problem---affects the
physician's ability to practice with skill and safety, he is impaired. At this point,
the medical board-the public's protector-has an interest, maybe even the
duty, to insure the physician receives treatment. 130

In contrast, medical society programs are seen as more effective because doctors
do not feel threatened by board action. They also enjoy confidentiality. For example, in
Kentucky the purpose of the Impaired Physicians Committee (IPC) "is to help the
physician." Blondell, supra note 126, at 64. IPC responses depend on circumstances. The
physician appears at a regular committee meeting. If he decides the IPC can help him,
they enter into a "contract." Although not meant to be legally binding, it "outlines the
relationship between the physician and the IPC and acts as a mutual commitment to the
physician's continuing recovery." Id. Participation is voluntary, but most cooperate.
Although the goals and methods of the IPC are complementary to those of the state
medical board, some sharp distinctions exist. The fundamental difference is function.
The board's duty is to protect the public. Therefore, the impaired physician's
involvement is mandatory. The board must provide due process rather than act, as the
IPC may, on hearsay. The good working relationship between board and IPC benefits
both the impaired physician and the public. Id. This means impaired physicians are
likely to join sooner. However, the perceived problem with these programs is boards
and the public may believe information is insufficient to insure public safety. Ikeda &
Pelton, supra note 129, at 617-18.
Ironically, in light of this recurring controversy, discussion at a national program
director's conference led to the conclusion that "the different models of organization did
not appear tobe the overriding factor in making a program effective.... The major factor
was how organizational agencies representing the different entities worked together.
In states where these agencies have developed trust and mutual respect, the programs
work well indeed." Id. at 618.
13OSo, for example, the Committee on Impaired Physicians in Rhode Island will not
intervene until the doctor's illness affects his professional activity. However, when
substance abuse is the disease, "waiting for professional impairment would be
comparable to waiting for cancer to metastasize before initiating treatment." Herbert
Rakatansky, Special Report, The Committee on Impaired Physicians of the Rhode Island
Medical Society, 68 R.I. MED. J. 119, 119-20 (Mar. 1985). This is because every area of a
doctor's life-"family, community relationships, and financial affairs-is affected
adversely before the professional aspects." Id. at 120.
Nevertheless, of 100 physicians in continuing care contracts with the Georgia
Impaired Physicians Program, 26 percent reported state medical license problems at the
time of admission into the program. Thirty-seven percent reported a problem with their
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VI. CONCLUSION

Locked into their anachronistic and discriminatory notions, medical boards
improperly and illegally equate certain illnesses with impairment. Board
practices are anachronistic because they shun medical epidemiology defining
mental illnesses and substance abuse disorders and ignore the infrequency of
impairment associated with these diseases. Decisions are discriminatory
because current solutions are based on disability. Not only are such decisions
morally reprehensible and not responsive to the very real problem of bad
doctors, they violate the ADA.
People with disabilities are now a suspect class. Licensing or certifying
procedures which relegate the disabled to "lesser . . . opportunities" by
"limiting" them based on disability must be narrowly tailored to protect the
public from physicians who fail to practice with skill and safety. Instead, some
boards tenaciously cling to their outdated prejudices against people suffering
from mental disorders. As doctors, they should know better.
The system is further complicated by an elaborate reporting system-the
Federation, the National Practitioner Data Bank, and direct communication
among the boards. Reporting license restrictions based on professional
incompetence and misconduct is critical in assuring quality medical care for
all Americans. Reporting illness-based limitations does little to protect the
public and is a substantial invasion of the physician's privacy and a violation
of the ADA. Further, some boards misunderstand and misuse the information.
The solution is clear. Boards must impose and report conditions based on
impairment or behavior rather than illness and obey the ADA mandate to end
discrimination against sick people.

drug enforcement license status. Karl V. Gallegos et al., Relapse and recovery: Five to ten
yearfollow-upstudy ofchemicallydependentphysicians-The Georgiaexperience, 41 MD. MED.
J. 315, 317 Table 3 (Apr. 1992).

